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We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model trade wars and territorial annexation.
Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and aggressive (mili-
tary/tariff) power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We
consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of
some fraction of its original resources. In particular, we derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two
country conflicts under different scenarios. This work is relevant for the ongoing US-China trade
war, and the recent Russian capture of Crimea, as well as historical and future conflicts.
1. INTRODUCTION
Auctions have long been used as mathematical models
of competition [1–7]. A setting useful for certain com-
petitions is the ‘all pay’ auction, in which losing bidders
are required to pay a forfeit [7, 8]. International military
conflicts provide perhaps the ultimate form of competi-
tion, and here we employ all pay auctions as a model of
military territorial expansions and trade wars. We are
unaware of any existing auction models of trade wars, al-
though this is quite a natural description, and there are
also few game theoretic analyses (although see e.g. [9]).
Building on earlier work due to Hodler and Yektas¸ [10]
in which an all-pay auction model is used to model total
military conquest, we expand this framework to study
the case of partial military conquest in which the victor
takes only a fraction of the loser’s resources, i.e. the victor
expands their territory at the expense of the loser. This
generalization is mathematically non-trivial and is more
relevant to real world events, such as the Russian annexa-
tion of the Crimean Peninsula and the Israeli annexation
of the Golan Heights. We also offer an reinterpretation
of this framework in the context of trade wars.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we
introduce the mathematical set-up of Hodler and Yektas¸
[10], and discuss how this model can be generalised to ex-
plore partial resource losses following a conflict between
two countries. We formulate this scenario in terms of
an all-pay auction with payoff function W . In Section 3
we discuss the mutual best responses for each country
without incorporating constraints and then subsequently
outline the conditions for quasi-equilibria. In contrast
to [10], obtaining the quasi-equilibria is mathematically
non-trivial and is the focus of Sections 4 & 5. We first
solve the relevant equations exactly for the special case
that neither country has a competitive edge in Section 4.
Then, in Section 5, we find an approximate solution for
the quasi equilibrium strategies for the more general case.
Section 6 provides a discussion of our results and an in-
terpretation of the mathematical framework in terms of
both conventional conflicts and trade wars.
2. FRACTIONAL RESOURCE FORFEITURE
Emulating [10], we characterize the two countries (la-
belled by i = 1, 2) by their aggressive (e.g. military)
power λ˜i ∈ R
+, production level β˜i ∈ R
+, and ex-
pected resource level Ri ∈ R
+. While the values of these
three variables are public knowledge, a private variable
ri ∈ [0, 1] is introduced such that the actual resource en-
dowment of a country 2riRi is private information known
only to a given country. The private variables ri are pub-
licly known to be distributed uniformly.
Furthermore, we introduce the notation λi = 2R1λ˜i
and βi = 2R1β˜i which corresponds to the maximum po-
tential aggression and production, respectively. We also
define the ratio between countries of these quantities
λ =
λ1
λ2
and β =
β1
β2
.
It can be assumed without loss of generality that β ≤ λ;
implying Country 1 has an advantage in aggressive po-
tential, while Country 2 has an advantage in production.
Suppose that bi is the resource allocation, such that
biλi is allocated to aggressive actions and (ri − bi)βi is
allocated to production and define the equilibrium strate-
gies fi(ri) = bi such that fi(ri) : [0, 1] → [0, ri]. It will
be useful to note the follow lemma from [10]:
Lemma 1 (HY [10]). For a function fi(ri) ∈ [0, ri], in
any monotone equilibrium then f1(0) = f2(0) = 0. Fur-
ther, f1 and f2 are non-decreasing and λf1(1) = f2(1).
It is assumed that the country with more aggressive
potential will win the competition, acquiring a fraction
of resources α ∈ [0, 1] from the losing party, while also
retaining all of their initial resource endowment. This
can be encapsulated in the following payoff function
Wi =


αβi(ri − bi) λibi < λjbj
βi(ri − bi) λibi = λjbj
βi(ri − bi) + (1 − α)βj(rj − bj) λibi > λjbj
.
(1)
Note that taking α = 1 recovers the case studied in [10].
23. EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
Given the form of Wi it follows that the payoff for
Country 1 making an optimal bid y = f(r1) is given by
u1(y) =
∫ f−1
2
(λy)
0
[β1(r1 − y) + (1− α)β2(r2 − f2(r2))] dr2
+
∫ 1
f
−1
2
(λy)
[αβ1(r1 − y)] dr2.
One can formulate each countries mutual best response:
Lemma 2. Disregarding any constraints, the mutual best
responses for each party is to follow strategies of the form
f1(r1) =
K0
(λ+ 2β)(1 − α)
((1 − α)r1 + α)
β
λ
+
β
β + 2λ
r1 −
α(βλ + β + 2λ)
(β + λ)(β + 2λ)(1 − α)
+K1((1 − α)r1 + α)
−(1+ β
λ
),
f2(r2) =
λβK
−
λ
β
0
(2λ+ β)(1 − α)
((1 − α)r2 + α)
λ
β
+
λ
2β + λ
r2 −
αβλ(1 + 2β + λ)
(β + λ)(2β + λ)(1 − α)
+K2((1 − α)r2 + α)
−(1+ λ
β
) ,
(2)
where K0, K1, and K2 are arbitrary constants.
Proof. To identify the value of y which maximizes the
payoff function u1(y) for Country 1, we set the derivative
with respect to y to zero to obtain the condition
F (y)
df−12 (λy)
dy
= βf−12 (λy) +
αβ
1− α
. (3)
where F (y) = β(f−11 (y) − y) + f
−1
2 (λy) − λy. Writing
Country 2’s bid similarly as y = f2(r2) to maximise the
payoff y should satisfy
F (y)
df−11 (y)
λdy
= f−11 (y) +
α
1− α
. (4)
Since the factor F (y) appears in both eqns. (3) & (4) we
can substitute for one of these factors, leading to
(ln[(1− α)f−12 (λy) + α])
′ =
β
λ
(ln[(1 − α)f−11 (y) + α])
′.
Integrating, it follows that
(1− α)f−12 (λy) + α = K0((1 − α)f
−1
1 (y) + α)
β
λ , (5)
where K0 is a constant. To proceed we identify that
Country 1’s optimal bid f1(r1) = y is related to Country
2’s optimal bid f2(r2) = z by y = z/λ.
Then substituting eq. (5) back into eq. (3) and eq. (4),
and also substituting for x and y, we obtain the following
two equations:
λ
df1(r1)
dr1
=K0((1 − α)r1 + α)
β
λ
−1 −
α
(1− α)r1 + α
−
(1− α)(β + λ)f1(r1)
(1− α)r1 + α
+
(1− α)βr1
(1− α)r1 + α
,
β
df2(r2)
dr2
=λβK
−
λ
β
0 ((1− α)r2 + α)
λ
β
−1 −
λβα
(1− α)r2 + α
−
(1− α)(β + λ)f2(r2)
(1− α)r2 + α
+
(1 − α)λr2
(1− α)r2 + α
.
Solving the above first order differential equations for f1
and f2 yields the stated result.
To find the quasi-equilibrium strategies of each player,
we apply the boundary conditions below (following [10])
f1(0) = f2(0) = 0
f1(1) = f2(1)/λ .
(6)
These conditions are appropriate to the problem due to
the properties highlighted in Lemma 1.
These boundary conditions lead to three equations in-
volving three unknown constants K0,K1,K2. Solving
the two conditions at ri = 0 for K1 and K2 in terms of
K0, the final boundary condition f1(1) = f2(1)/λ can be
expressed in the following form
aK0 + bK
−
λ
β
0 = c, (7)
where
a =
λ(1− α1+2
β
λ )
(λ+ 2β)(1 − α)
,
b =
λβ(1 − α1+2
λ
β )
(2λ+ β)(α − 1)
,
c = −
βλ
β + 2λ
+
αλ(βλ + β + 2λ)(1 − α1+
β
λ )
(β + λ)(β + 2λ)(1− α)
+
λ
2β + λ
−
αβλ(1 + 2β + λ)(1 − α1+
λ
β )
(β + λ)(2β + λ)(1 − α)
.
(8)
Unfortunately, eq. (7) does not a have an exact general
solution, but as a first approach in the next section we
will investigate the case λ = β which is exactly solvable.
4. QUASI-EQUILIBRIA FOR THE CASE λ = β
The case λ = β implies λ1/β1 = λ2/β2 and represents
the scenario in which neither country has a comparative
advantage in aggressive power for a given level of pro-
duction. Note that λ = β = 1 would imply that both
countries are equal in both aggressive power and produc-
tion level, and thus neither country has any advantage.
3Theorem 1. The quasi-equilibrium strategies for each
country for λ = β and ri ∈ [0, 1] are
f1(r1) =
β + 1
3β
r1 −
α(β + 1)
6β(1− α)
+
α3(β + 1)
6β(1− α)3(r1 +
α
1−α )
2
,
f2(r2) =
β + 1
3
r2 −
α(β + 1)
6(1− α)
+
α3(β + 1)
6(1− α)3(r2 +
α
1−α )
2
.
Proof. For λ = β the exponent of K
−
λ
β
0 is simply −1 and
the coefficients of eq. (8) simplify to
a =
(1− α3)
3(1− α)
, b =
β(1 − α3)
3(α− 1)
,
c =
1− β
3
+
1
3
α(1 + α)(1 − β) .
Therefore, eq. (7) simplifies to(
1 + α+ α2
3
)(
K20 − (1− β)K0 − β
)
= 0,
which has solutions K0 = 1,−β. Since β ≥ 0 and from
eq. (5) it follows K0 ≥ 0, we hence take K0 = 1. Then
evaluating the forms ofK1 andK2 (obtained through the
conditions f1(0) = f2(0) = 0) we obtain
K1 =
α3(β + 1)
6β(1 − α)
, K2 =
α3(β + 1)
6(1− α)
.
Substituting K0 = 1, and the forms forK1 andK2 above,
into the expressions of Lemma 1 completes the proof.
Corollary 1. The quasi-equilibrium strategies for each
country for λ = β are related via
f2(ri) = βf1(ri) .
This result implies that whichever country has the ab-
solute advantage in both aggressive power and produc-
tion is expected to win the trade war. Moreover, for the
sub-case λ = β = 1, in which the two countries have
equal strength in both aggressive power and production,
the equilibrium strategies are identical.
5. QUASI-EQUILIBRIA FOR THE CASE λ 6= β
An analysis of λ 6= β requires a little care, since for
λ 6= β the equations exhibit singularities for ri → 0. As
a result, a minor modification is required to consider the
more general case. Specifically, to obtain the equilibrium
strategies for the more general case we will restrict the
private resource variable to ri ∈ [ǫ, 1] for some small pos-
itive constant ǫ. The presence of a fixed ǫ cuts off the
divergences and in this case eq. (7) can be solved. The
analysis however is substantially more complicated than
the earlier case studied here (and the study in [10]).
Introducing this infinitesimal ǫ, we adapt the boundary
conditions of eq. (6) to the following
f1(ǫ) = f2(ǫ) = 0, f1(1) = f2(1)/λ . (9)
Taking eq. (2) of Lemma 2 and evaluating f1 at ǫ gives
f1(ǫ) =
K0
(λ + 2β)(1− α)
[
α
(
1 +
1− α
α
ǫ
)] β
λ
+
βǫ
β + 2λ
−
α(βλ + β + 2λ)
(β + λ)(β + 2λ)(1 − α)
+K1
[
α(1 +
1− α
α
ǫ)
]
−(1+ β
λ
)
.
Taking first the boundary condition f1(ǫ) = 0 and solving
forK1 at first order in the infinitesimal quantity ǫ implies
K1 =
K0α
β
λ
(λ+2β)(1−α)
(
1 + (1−α)βǫ
αλ
)
+ βǫ
β+2λ −
α(βλ+β+2λ)
(β+λ)(β+2λ)(1−α)
α−(1+
β
λ
)((1 + β
λ
)1−α
α
ǫ− 1)
.
(10)
Then applying the next condition f2(ǫ) = 0 and solving
for K2 at first order in ǫ gives
K2 =
λβK
−
λ
β
0
α
λ
β
(2λ+β)(1−α)
(
1 + (1−α)λǫ
αβ
)
+ λǫ2β+λ −
αβλ(1+2β+λ)
(β+λ)(2β+λ)(1−α)
α−(1+
λ
β
)((1 + λ
β
)1−α
α
ǫ− 1)
.
(11)
The final boundary condition f1(1) = f2(1)/λ requires
K0
(λ+ 2β)(1 − α)
+
β
β + 2λ
−
α(βλ + β + 2λ)
(β + λ)(β + 2λ)(1− α)
+K1
=
βK
−
λ
β
0
(2λ+ β)(1 − α)
+
1
2β + λ
−
αβ(1 + 2β + λ)
(β + λ)(2β + λ)(1 − α)
+
K2
λ
.
(12)
Substituting the forms of K1 and K2 into the above and
rearranging, we arrive at the condition
K0 =
C3 − C1K
−
λ
β
0
C2
, (13)
where C1, C2 and C3 are parameter dependent constants
C1 =
β
(1− α)(2λ + β)

1 + α
λ
β
(
1 + λ(1−α)
αβ
ǫ
)
α−(1+
λ
β
)((1 + λ
β
)1−α
α
ǫ− 1)

 ,
C2 =
1
(1− α)(λ + 2β)

1 + α
β
λ
(
1 + β(1−α)
αλ
ǫ
)
α−(1+
β
λ
)((1 + β
λ
)1−α
α
ǫ− 1)

 ,
C3 =
α
(β + λ)(1 − α)
(
β(1 + 2β + λ)
(2β + λ)
−
(βλ+ β + 2λ)
(β + 2λ)
)
+
β
β + 2λ
+
β
β+2λǫ−
α(βλ+β+2λ)
(β+λ)(β+2λ)(1−α)
α−(1+
β
λ
)((1 + β
λ
)1−α
α
ǫ− 1)
−
1
2β + λ
−
1
2β+λǫ−
αβ(1+2β+λ)
(β+λ)(2β+λ)(1−α)
α−(1+
λ
β
)((1 + λ
β
)1−α
α
ǫ− 1)
.
4Solving eq. (13) analytically for K0 is challenging, how-
ever an approximate solution can be found via iterative
methods, as we show below.
To proceed we take the zeroth order approximation
to be K
(0)
0 = 1 (the value found in Theorem 1). The
first order value K
(1)
0 is found by taking K
(0)
0 ≈ 1 on
the RHS of eq. (13), implying K
(1)
0 ≈
C3−C1
C2
. Then an
approximate solution for K0 is provided by the second
order iteration K
(2)
0 found by substituting K
(1)
0 into the
RHS of eq. (13) to obtain
K
(2)
0 ≈
C3
C2
−
C1
C2
(
C3 − C1
C2
)
−
λ
β
. (14)
Finally, using this second order approximate expres-
sion K
(2)
0 , along with the exact forms of K1 and K2
obtained in eqns. (10) & (11) in eq. (2) of Lemma 2,
we derive the approximate equilibrium strategies for the
more general case with λ 6= β. Specifically, we obtain the
following result:
Theorem 2. The quasi-equilibrium strategies for each
country for ri ∈ [ǫ, 1] to leading order in ǫ and to second
order precision in K0 are given by eq. (15).
f1(r1) ≈
(
C3
C2
−
C1
C2
(
C3 − C1
C2
)
−
λ
β
)
((1 − α)r1 + α)
β
λ
(λ+ 2β)(1 − α)
+
β
β + 2λ
r1 −
α(βλ + β + 2λ)
(β + λ)(β + 2λ)(1− α)
+
[
K0
(λ+2β)(1−α)α
β
λ (1 + β(1−α)
αλ
ǫ) + β
β+2λǫ−
α(βλ+β+2λ)
(β+λ)(β+2λ)(1−α)
α−(1+
β
λ
)((1 + β
λ
)1−α
α
ǫ− 1)
]
((1 − α)r1 + α)
−(1+ β
λ
),
f2(r2) ≈λβ
(
C3
C2
−
C1
C2
(
C3 − C1
C2
)
−
λ
β
)−λ
β
((1 − α)r2 + α)
λ
β
(2λ+ β)(1 − α)
+
λ
2β + λ
r2 −
αβλ(1 + 2β + λ)
(β + λ)(2β + λ)(1 − α)
+
[ λβK−λβ
0
(2λ+β)(1−α)α
λ
β (1 + λ(1−α)
αβ
ǫ) + λ2β+λ ǫ−
αβλ(1+2β+λ)
(β+λ)(2β+λ)(1−α)
α−(1+
λ
β
)((1 + λ
β
)1−α
α
ǫ− 1)
]
((1− α)r2 + α)
−(1+ λ
β
) .
(15)
6. DISCUSSION
Auction theory has previously been used to model com-
petition between animals [11], countries [10, 12] and indi-
viduals or groups [13–15]. Moreover, for game theoretic
approaches to military conflicts see [16–20]. Here we have
extended the earlier work of Hodler and Yektas¸ [10], on
forfeiture due to conflicts, to include the important case
of partial resource losses. In our analysis the fraction of
resources ceded by the loser is controlled by the variable
α ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the variable α measures loss of re-
sources, thus in the context of military conquest α need
not strictly measure captured land area, since resources
(oil, minerals, etc.) may not be distributed uniformly.
Notably, one of the more novel and topical applications
of the all pay auction model developed here is to model
trade wars. Trade wars occur when two countries create
tariffs in response to the other country. Each country
is looking to limit their opponent economically, however
this also typically harms their domestic consumers, as
the price of certain items will increase due to lack of im-
ported materials and thus creation of tariffs entails a cost.
The original interpretation put forward in [10] was that
λ˜i corresponded to military power and the forfeit for the
losing country was a total loss of resources. The frame-
work presented here can be reinterpreted as a model of
trade wars if the variable λ˜i is taken to be the ability of a
country to introduce tariffs, while α is interpreted as an
economic loss (e.g. market share) relative to competitors.
In the context of trade wars, Lemma 3 gives the exact
equilibrium strategies when neither country has a com-
parative advantage for a given level of production, and
Lemma 6 gives the approximate solution for countries
with dissimilar tariffs or production rates.
We note that this analysis assumes net-zero economic
loss between the two countries. This simplifying assump-
tion could be relaxed by modifying the (1 − α) term in
eq. (1) to include an additional κ ∈ [0, 1] variable which
accounts for loss to third party competitors who are not
otherwise involved in the trade war, such that α ∈ [0, κ].
Trade wars have become an important element of cur-
rent world economics. However, there are few theoretical
analyses of trade wars and this work, in the context of
auction theory, adds a new aspect to the literature.
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